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1917: 90 Years On 
Masterpiece to Massacre: the New Zealand Division and three battles
 
by Glyn Harper 
 
The year 1917 was the worst year of the war for the allies. It was a year 
of German victories on the Eastern and Italian Fronts, but costly failed 
allied offensives on the Western Front, the decisive theatre of war. 
Operations on the Western Front were severely hampered by the 
appalling weather conditions that year. Spring arrived late, summer 
amounted to three weeks of fine weather and 1917 saw the heaviest 
rainfall in 75 years combined with one of the most severe winters on 
record. Marshal Ferdinand Foch warned at the beginning of October as 
the battles of Passchendaele were underway, that it was impossible to 
wage war against both Germans and mud.1 This would be just one of the 
many painful lessons learned at Passchendaele.  
 
For the New Zealand Division 1917 was a crucial year. Brought up to full 
strength after its severe blooding on the Somme in September 1916 and 
after spending many months training the large number of reinforcements, 
the New Zealand Division was involved in three set piece battles and two 
minor actions during the year. Prior to the first military engagement of 
1917 the New Zealand Division was in the peak of its condition. At the 
end of the year after suffering its worst ever military disaster the Division 
was a spent force incapable of further military action. This presentation 
briefly examines the three battles and offers some comment on the 
enduring legacy of 1917. 
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Masterpiece 1: Messines June 1917 
As a preliminary to the launch of the BEF’s main offensive for 1917 the 
Messines Ridge was to be captured. This ridgeline ran for nearly ten 
kilometres from St Yves in the south to just beyond Wytschaete. This 
would secure the southern flank of the Ypres offensive planned later in 
the year as well as ejecting the Germans from a vital piece of high ground 
thus denying them observation over the potential battlefield. 
 
Responsibility for mounting the attack at Messines was assigned to 
General Herbert Plumer’s Second Army which had spent many months 
planning and preparing it. Plumer, despite his unmilitary appearance, was 
one of the most able generals in the BEF and this operation involved 
several innovative features. For a start the objectives were strictly limited 
in what Plumer’s colleague General Henry Rawlinson called a “bite and 
hold” operation. Capture of the ridgeline was the ultimate prize; there was 
to be no attempt at breaking through the German lines.  Artillery support, 
upon which success of the operation depended, was to be overwhelming: 
more than 2,000 guns of which a third were heavy and medium. The 
American military theorist Stephen Biddle has calculated that the ten-day 
artillery bombardment that preceded the infantry attack on 7 June was “of 
literally atomic magnitude” with more explosive power than a US W48 
tactical nuclear warhead  dumped on every mile of the German frontline 
trenches.2 The infantry from the nine divisions involved in this attack and 
with three more in reserve, were both well trained and moved into 
location early so that most commenced the attack well rested. Railways 
had been constructed right up to the start line to ensure adequate logistical 
support throughout the operation. All preparations had been made under 
cover of darkness so as to preserve the element of surprise. Then there 
was the knockout blow. Twenty-one mine shifts had been sunk deep 
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under the German lines and filled with more than a million pounds of 
high explosive. Their detonation would signal the start of the attack. As 
the Australian official historian, Charles Bean commented on Messines: 
“Never had a big British operation been prepared in such detail.”3  
 
The New Zealand Division had a key role in this attack. As a result of 
being involved in only minor actions since leaving the Somme in October 
1916 and being able to train those formations not holding the front-line 
trenches the Division was in fine form for this attack. In April 1917 the 
various artillery and infantry brigades underwent, in turn, 12 days of 
intensive training for their roles in forthcoming offensive. The history of 
the New Zealand Division records of this training: 
 
… nothing was left undone to achieve realism. The ground at the 
training area happened to conform with the actual position to be 
assaulted, and replicas of the whole German trenches and our 
assembly ones were cut out a foot deep to scale. In these, battalions 
and brigades rehearsed the delicate operations of the assembly and 
attack, and attained the invaluable certainty of purpose. The final 
full-dress rehearsals were witnessed and criticized by the Second 
Army Commander and his Staff.4
 
The training for Messines included testing tactics for open warfare and 
for obtaining the maximum firepower from the recent reorganization of 
platoons into specialized sections of riflemen, Lewis gunners, bombers 
and rifle bombers.  As a result the historian Christopher Pugsley believes 
that the New Zealand Division was “at its peak” for Messines. He writes 
that “the combination of enthusiasm, esprit de corps and training reached 
its high point for this battle.”5  
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In II Anzac Corps sector the New Zealand Division was in the centre 
between the 3rd Australian Division on the right and the British 25th 
Division on the left. Its role included the capture of the heavily fortified 
Messines village upon which the whole Army plan depended. Once the 
village was taken the 4th Australian Division could pass through it on the 
way to the final objective, a line about a mile beyond the crest.   
 
At 3:10 am on the morning of 7 June the mines went up (only 19 of them 
exploded) and a colossal barrage over a kilometre deep crashed down on 
the German defences. The noise from the explosion was distinctly heard 
as far away as the United Kingdom and an observatory on the Isle of 
Wight registered it on its seismograph.6 The war correspondent Philip 
Gibbs described it as:  
 
The most diabolical splendour I have ever seen. Out of the dark 
ridges of Messines and Wytschaete and that ill-famed Hill 60 there 
gushed out and up enormous volumes of scarlet flame from the 
exploding mines and of earth and smoke all lighted up by the flame 
spilling over into mountains of fierce colour, so that the 
countryside was illuminated by red light.7
 
A German officer on the receiving end of this “diabolical splendour” 
recorded this vivid account of the event and its effect on his battalion: 
 
In the front line the relief was in full swing: when suddenly, at 4.00 
am, there was an almighty roar and the earth began to quake and 
everything flew off the chairs: explosion! Attack! Both officers and 
men poured out of the entrance into the open air. An awe-inspiring 
and appalling sight met their eyes. The hills from Wijtschate to 
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Messines were enveloped in a great sea of flames. Fourteen fiery 
volcanoes and masses of earth erupted vertically into the sky 
colouring it a blood red. Then the great masses of earth crashed 
back down to the ground and, simultaneously, drum fire of an 
unprecedented violence crashed down. Time passed worryingly 
then, at about 5.00 am a runner arrived from the front, with 
dreadful news: ‘3rd Battalion Bavarian Infantry Regiment 17 has 
been blown sky high.’8
 
Many other German battalions on the ridge suffered a similar fate.  
 
Immediately following this eruption the infantry from the nine assault 
divisions moved off in the semi-darkness and advanced into the smoke 
and dust-cloud that hung over the ridge. Moving behind a protective 
artillery barrage they occupied the Messines Ridge almost unopposed. So 
effective was the British artillery’s counter battery fire that it was ten 
minutes before a feeble German barrage fired on the advancing infantry. 
By then it was too late. 
 
The New Zealand Division easily captured Messines village by 7:00 am 
and a New Zealand soldier, Lance Corporal Samuel Frickleton, won a 
Victoria Cross in the fighting to clear the village’s outskirts.  That 
afternoon the New Zealanders repelled a German counterattack which 
crumpled under heavy machine gun and artillery fire.  
 
The New Zealand infantry remained around (but not in) the village of 
Messines for the next two days and it was then they experienced the bulk 
of their casualties. The exposed ridgeline was overcrowded with allied 
soldiers and the New Zealand position was no exception. Major General 
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Russell requested but had not been permitted to thin out his defences.9 
The German artillery, once it had recovered from the shock of the 
opening attack, pounded the Messines village and its outskirts 
mercilessly. On 8 June those New Zealanders on the ridge endured a 
German artillery bombardment that lasted uninterrupted for ten hours. 
Fortunately though, the survivors were withdrawn into reserve the next 
morning.   
 
The attack, beginning in the early hours of 7 June 1917 was a complete 
success, the finest of the war to date according to Field Marshal Sir 
Douglas Haig. The battle of Messines came to be regarded as a model for 
offensives on the Western Front. Careful planning, effective preparation, 
and excellent infantry-artillery cooperation had produced an outstanding 
success. As Russell later commented: 
 
The battle … was won through the weight of metal thrown on to 
the enemy positions and the mettle of the men who advanced to 
attack. Everything went like clockwork.10
 
This success did not come cheap though; it never did on the Western 
Front. When the New Zealanders were withdrawn from Messines village 
on the morning of 9 June they had suffered nearly 4,000 casualties of 
which some 700 were killed in action in just over two days of fighting.11
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Masterpiece 2: Broodseinde 4 October 1917 
New Zealand’s next large-scale military actions were the two attacks 
made in October 1917 in the Flanders region of Belgium as part of Third 
Battle of Ypres. They rank as two of the most significant military 
engagements the country has ever undertaken. 
 
The Third Battle of Ypres was the BEF’s main campaign for 1917 and it 
aimed to clear the Germans from the Belgian Channel Ports as well as 
relieving pressure on the French Army in the south. If it succeeded it 
would be a strategic victory seriously damaging Germany’s ability to 
remain in the war.   Beginning on 31 July and ending on 10 November 
1917, Third Ypres consisted of eight separate battles.  The New Zealand 
Division took part in just two of these.  They were the battle of 
Broodseinde on 4 October and First Passchendaele fought just over a 
week later on 12 October. 
 
The attack of 4 October aimed to seize the first low ridge in front of 
Passchendaele as a preliminary to taking the village itself in a subsequent 
push. Twelve divisions would be taking part along an eight mile front. 
There was a unique element to this attack. In the centre making the main 
thrust, for the only time in history, four Anzac Divisions would attack 
side by side. On the right (south) I Anzac Corps (1st and 2nd Australian 
Divisions) would attack on a 2000 yard front with the village of 
Broodseinde and the surrounding ridge as their objective. To their north II 
Anzac Corps with 3rd Australian Division on the right and the New 
Zealand Division on the left, would attack on a 3000 yard front with the 
object of taking the Gravenstafel Spur. The three Australian divisions 
were to secure the whole of the Broodseinde Ridge including the town of 
Zonnebeke and Broodseinde village. The New Zealanders, advancing on 
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a 2000 yard front to a depth of just over 1000 yards, were to concentrate 
on the Abraham Heights and the Gravenstafel Spur itself. 
 
While the objectives were strictly limited, varying from 1200 to 2000 
yards, this was still a formidable task. It involved the four Anzac 
divisions advancing up open slopes which were chequered with strong 
defensive positions including many ferro-concrete pillboxes. They would 
be under full observation of the Germans on the heights throughout the 
attack. However, the key to success was the overwhelming artillery 
support provided to the attackers. Second Army had some 796 medium 
and heavy guns available and 1548 field guns and howitzers. The New 
Zealand Division was allocated a generous portion of this support: one-
hundred and eighty 18 pounders (field guns), sixty 4.5 inch howitzers and 
sixty-eight machine guns. These would provide four distinct barrages to 
assist the advancing infantry including a creeping barrage throughout the 
attack and standing barrages once each objective had been taken. As one 
New Zealand historian noted the attack was to be “a limited advance with 
unlimited explosives to blast out a way. If the weather held it must 
succeed.”12
 
The weather did hold – only just – and the battle of Broodseinde was a 
stunning success for all those divisions of Second Army taking part. The 
New Zealand Division easily captured all its objectives advancing the 
British line by nearly 2,000 yards and taking 1,159 German prisoners.  
New Zealand casualties were heavy numbering 1,853 of which more than 
450 had been killed. One of those killed was a 43 year old sergeant in the 
2nd Auckland Battalion named David Gallaher. Gallaher had been the 
inspirational captain of the 1905 All Blacks – the Originals – and he had 
enlisted in 1916 after learning that two of his brothers had been killed.  
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The New Zealand casualty rate was around 25 per cent in a battle where 
everything had gone according to plan.13 As one young soldier wrote of 4 
October: “Its marvelous the way these ‘Stunts’ as we call them are got up, 
everything run like clockwork.”14
 
But in the afternoon of 4 October heavy rain started falling turning the 
Flanders region into a quagmire. Prince Rupprecht, Crown Prince of 
Bavaria and the German Army commander, reflected after the attack of 
12 October that the rain was “our most effective ally”.15  Many 
experienced soldiers thought that this break in the weather meant an end 
to the Third Ypres offensive. It was not to be though, and the BEF’s 
commander, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, in the most controversial 
and questioned decision he made during the war ordered that it should 
continue. The New Zealand Division’s next attack would be far from a 
textbook or “clockwork” operation. 
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Massacre: First Passchendaele 12 October 1917 
The warning signs were clear to anyone who cared to notice them. 
Convinced that the Germans were near breaking point Haig ordered a 
new attack on 9 October which is known as the Battle of Poelcapelle. 
Poorly planned, lacking adequate artillery support, ignoring weather and 
terrain conditions the attack was a disaster for the 11 divisions involved. 
In the Anzac sector two British divisions, the 49th and the 66th of II Anzac 
Corps and the 2nd Australian Division of I Anzac Corps took part. While 
their planned advance was a short one, between 600 and 900 yards, not a 
single objective was taken and the casualties were horrendous. The 49th 
Division alone suffered more than 2,500 casualties in this attack. Yet still 
Haig persisted in continuing the offensive writing in his diary that the 
results of this attack “were very successful”. Then he informed his 
headquarters: 
 
I am of the opinion that the operations of the 49th and 66th 
Divisions, carried out today under great difficulties of assembly, 
will afford the II Anzac Corps a sufficiently good jumping off line 
for operations on October 12th, on which date I hope that the II 
Anzac Corps will capture Passchendaele.16
 
The New Zealand Division and the 3rd Australian Division were now 
condemned to make an attack that should never have gone ahead. 
 
Never in its history have New Zealand troops been ordered to carry out an 
attack in such unfavourable circumstances. Nothing at all was right for it. 
Here is a brief list: 
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- the terrain was like glutinous porridge and it was raining heavily. 
This made a mockery of any attempt at tactical finesse like fire and 
manoeuvre and outflanking enemy strong points 
- the objectives were very deep, over 3,000 yards. It included those set 
for 9 October. 
- only two days were allocated to plan and coordinate the attack. 
- artillery support was totally inadequate as the CRA (Napier 
Johnston) informed General Russell before the attack commenced. 
Few guns had been moved forward; those that had been did not have 
stable gun platforms and were short of shells. 
- the troops were exhausted just reaching the start line and their morale 
was low. This was especially so for the 3rd Rifle Brigade which had 
just completed a month detached as laborers from the division, one of 
the disadvantages of maintaining a four brigade division. Since 4 
September, the 3rd Rifle Brigade had been in the Ypres salient burying 
telephone cables and constructing roads. This work had to be done at 
night, often while wearing gas masks. The Brigade’s history candidly 
admits that in October its soldiers “were almost worn out and [were] 
certainly unready for immediate combative action”.17
The New Zealand stretcher bearers started the attack exhausted too 
having to clear the battlefield of over 200 wounded men left out since 
the debacle of 9 October. 
- the German obstacles ahead of them were formidable. These 
included the many pill boxes and two belts of barbed wire each about 
30 yards thick, all of which was clearly visible from the New Zealand 
start line. What was not observed though were the many hidden 
machine gun nests and sniper teams moved into position for this 
attack. 
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- the German defenders knew the attack was coming. Not only could 
they see the preparations being made but a British deserter and three 
other soldiers captured in raids on the night of 11 October informed 
their captors of the exact time of the attack.18
 
Really the attack was doomed before it even started. This is not the 
hindsight of an historian either. Those New Zealand soldiers in the line on 
the morning of 12 October knew that the task ahead of them was 
formidable and that their prospects of survival were slim.  
 
 
First Passchendaele on 12 October was an absolute disaster.  Nothing 
went to plan and the fate of this attack is best reflected in its opening 
artillery barrage. It was universally condemned as “very feeble”.19 Worse 
than this it damaged the wrong people. Leonard Hart of 1 Otago Battalion 
recalled: 
 
Through some blunder our artillery barrage opened up about two 
hundred yards short of the specified range and thus opened right in 
the midst of us. It was a truly awful time – our men getting cut to 
pieces in dozens by our own guns. Immediate disorganization 
followed.20
 
Leonard Hart’s infantry company lost 148 of its 180 members on this 
morning.21
 
The two New Zealand infantry brigades making this attack – 2nd Brigade 
(the South Island Battalions) and the 3rd New Zealand Rifle Brigade – 
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suffered devastating losses. Most New Zealand soldiers never saw a 
German that morning. Here are two brief accounts: 
 
Corporal Harold Green, C Company of the 3rd Rifles: 
 
At 6 am a tremendous bombardment opened and we went over in a 
sea of mud. The fire from the German pill boxes was hellish and 
our barrage failed. The emplacements for our guns were not solid 
enough and the guns tilted causing trouble in our ranks from the 
shells of our own 18 pounders. The wire entanglements, the mud 
and the pill boxes prevented any success. C Company lost heavily 
and the 3rd Battalion lost about half its numbers in casualties. Our 
Colonel, Winter-Evans, was killed. 150 of C Company went over  
and casualties numbered 82, including all the sergeants except 
Goodfellow. The attack was an impossible attempt. The ground 
was swampy and very muddy and heavy cross fire from the pill 
boxes did not give us a chance. The Black Watch on our left were 
in exactly the same position. The stunt should never have been 
ordered under such conditions. It was absolute murder.22
 
  
Private Ernest Langford of 2 Otago Battalion was more succinct: 
 
Attack a failure on account of wire encountered. Casualties 
extremely heavy. Hun machine guns and snipers play havoc. 
Absolute hell. … Brigade practically wiped out.23
 
Not one objective was taken and the cost was massive.  Some 846 New 
Zealanders were killed on this dismal Flanders morning and a further 
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2,000 soldiers were wounded.  Another 138 New Zealanders died of their 
wounds over the next week.24  More New Zealanders were killed or 
maimed in these few short hours than on any other day in the nation’s 
history. 
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 Third Ypres finished in November after the Canadians finally captured 
the red brick stains in the mud that had once been the village of 
Passchendaele. The offensive advanced the British line by six miles and 
captured the objectives that had been set for the first two weeks. The BEF 
suffered some 275,000 casualties of which 70,000 had been killed. The 
effects of this battle when combined with the dreadful climatic and terrain 
conditions “brought dire consequences” upon the morale and fighting 
ability of the BEF.25 Many writers have commented that for the first time 
in the war, after Third Ypres the BEF lost its confidence and sense of 
optimism which was replaced by a “deadly depression”.26 This was 
certainly the case for the New Zealand Division which experienced its 
nadir at the end of 1917. Every military formation has its breaking point 
and the New Zealand Division almost reached the limits of endurance at 
the close of 1917. For the survivors of Passchendaele the war seemed 
never-ending and ceased to have a purpose. More than this, they now 
began to doubt whether the allies could ever defeat Germany. Their sense 
of humour remained intact though and was one of the vital coping 
mechanisms available to soldiers. While they told newcomers that the war 
was going to last a lifetime, they reassured them that “The first seven 
years will be the hardest.”27
 
But for the New Zealanders the misery of 1917 was not finished. On 3 
December the 2nd Brigade carried out another costly attack at Polderhoek 
which gained some ground but not the objective. The New Zealand 
Division then wintered in the Ypres salient until relieved in late February 
and loathed the experience. While here they suffered another 3000 
casualties, most through sickness, but a further 500 New Zealand soldiers 
were killed.28 It really was a winter of discontent. 
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The Passchendaele experience left an enduring legacy for New Zealand. 
It was the one great military disaster the New Zealand Division suffered 
on the Western Front. It is the single event that encapsulates for most 
New Zealanders the experience of the First World War. A.J.P. Taylor 
wrote that the Somme battle in 1916 “set the picture by which future 
generations saw the First World War: brave helpless soldiers; blundering 
obstinate generals; nothing achieved.”29 But for New Zealand, which did 
not take part in the early disastrous stages of the Somme battle, it is the 
12 October attack that dominates public memory of the Western Front. 
As Professor Peter Simkins wrote earlier this year: “Passchendaele has 
never lost its power to shock even the most hardened student of the Great 
War and, to many people, it remains the quintessential symbol of the 
horrors of the fighting on the Western Front.”30
 
Of all New Zealand’s experience of war 12 October 1917 at 
Passchendaele has had the most significant impact on the nation with the 
possible exception of Gallipoli. It inflicted the deepest physical and 
psychological scars upon the New Zealand Division and on New Zealand 
society as a whole. Nearly every family was directly affected by this 
battle or knew people who were. Denied the rituals that are usually 
associated with death, no sense of closure accompanied these losses. The 
pain of separation and loss still endures. 
 
The bitterness and disenchantment experienced by the New Zealand 
soldiers who were there was taken back to New Zealand where it took 
root and grew. As one veteran stated: “the older we get the more bitter we 
feel about the needless suffering and loss of so many of our friends”.31 
Still another soldier who lost a brother at Passchendaele reflected more 
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than 70 years later: “In many respects it makes me so angry when I think 
of the terrible loss of life and the things we had to put up with in war”.32  
 
This bitterness is entirely understandable but the notion that it was futile, 
that this sacrifice was all for nothing is wrong and destructive. To be told 
and believe that your father, uncle, brother or cousin had died for nothing 
is the cruelest of legacies. As Hew Strachan, the Chichele Professor of the 
History of War at Oxford University, concluded in his masterly one 
volume overview of the war: 
 
In short it [the First World War] shaped not just Europe but the 
world in the twentieth century. It was emphatically not a war 
without meaning or purpose.33
 
As stated at the beginning of this paper, 1917 was the hardest year of the 
war for the allies and for the New Zealanders fighting on the Western 
Front. The New Zealand Division commenced the year in the peak of 
condition, but ended it close to breaking point. It was down, but definitely 
not out, as the events of March 1918 revealed. Just weeks after leaving 
the Ypres salient the New Zealand Division, along with eight other 
divisions was rushed south to plug huge gaps that had been punched in 
the line by the German Michael offensive. Here they performed what I 
consider to be their finest feat of the war playing a decisive role in 
defeating the Germans on the Somme. But that is a different story and I 
hope that next year I have a chance like this to tell it. 
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